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Angelika Krebs 
 
“As if the earth has long stopped speaking to us” 
Resonance with nature and its loss 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper explores the aesthetic case for landscape conservation. The main claim is 
that the experience of beautiful landscapes is an essential part of human flourishing; it 
is not just an enriching option for all of us and certainly not merely a subjective 
preference for some of us. Beautiful landscapes can make us feel at home in the world; 
this constitutes their great and irreplaceable value. 
 
As a first step, I embed the aesthetic argument in the large and diverse field of major 
arguments for the conservation of nature. Section one thus links environmental 
aesthetics with environmental ethics. 
 
In the second section, I clarify the concept of landscape, which brings me, in section 
three, to the concept of “Stimmung.” Section four shows how “Stimmung” (in the 
sense of mood) is infused into landscape (as atmosphere). Section five distinguishes 
various ways of how we experience landscape atmosphere, preparing the ground for 
the specifically aesthetic claim in section six: how, when we experience the 
atmosphere of a landscape aesthetically, we respond to it by resonating or feeling at 
home. 
 
The paper’s title, “As if the earth has long stopped speaking to us,” is taken from a 
novel by the German writer Peter Kurzeck. Literature like his can help us to better 
appreciate landscape beauty. Philosophy – with its concern for clear concepts and 
stringent arguments – should go hand in hand with literature and employ its power to 
make things vivid and “present.” If the aesthetic case for landscape conservation is to 
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be made as strong as possible so it can gain traction in the real world, philosophy and 
literature must join forces.1 
 
So before I embark on the stony conceptual road ahead, let me get you into the right 
mood by presenting a passage from Peter Kurzeck’s autobiographical 2003 novel Als 
Gast (“As a guest”). In the passage, the author recounts a walk he took with a friend in 
the city forest of Frankfurt, which – apart from the highway and its hum in the 
background – is as empty and quiet “as if the earth has long stopped speaking to us.”2 
 
Kurzeck’s written and spoken language is like music. It is “deep-acting.” It touches 
you immediately. This is why it can give us “knowledge by acquaintance” and make 
us feel the loss of nature. And this is why I quote it also in German. As yet, none of 
Kurzeck’s works has been translated into English. The following translations are my 
own, with help from others.3 
 
Durch das Waldstück jetzt, an seinem Rand hin. So ein schütteres kleines 
Waldstück – wie man auch geht, man geht immer am Rand. Und der Wald wie 
leergeräumt. Eher wie eben erst aufgestellt, sagst du dir. Keine Wurzeln? Ohne 
Wurzeln die Bäume? Von Fachleuten fachgerecht aufgestellt. Qualitätswald. 
Bestandsgarantie. Lebensgröße. Und mit Sorgfalt befestigt. Wie echt. Direkt 
beinah wie echt! Und so still, als ob die Erde, jeder Fleck Erde, die Pflanzen, 
die Steine und jedes Ding, als ob die Welt insgesamt längst aufgehört hätte, mit 
uns zu sprechen. Und wir dann auch mit uns selbst. Schon länger. Wir 
antworten nicht! So still, aber hinter der Stille ein Dröhnen, ein wachsendes 
Dröhnen. Von allen Seiten. Und kommt auf uns zu. Oder wie im eigenen Kopf 
drin. 
 
                                                 
1 For more on the relationship between philosophy and literature, cf. Angelika Krebs, Zwischen Ich und 
Du (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2015); as well as Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); M. W. Rowe, Philosophy and Literature (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004); and 
Gottfried Gabriel, Erkenntnis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015). 
2 This novel is by no means Peter Kurzeck’s major work on nature, its loss and what this loss means for 
us. His major work in this regard is Vorabend (“Eve”) from 2011. Across one thousand pages, this book 
tells the story of the second German “mobilization,” which after the war managed to turn most rural 
German villages into places through which a car could be driven in fourth gear. Kurzeck’s 2007 audio 
book Ein Sommer, der bleibt (“A summer that lasts”) is highly relevant for our topic as well. In the 
course of this paper, I will quote a five-minute passage from this audio book. 
3 My thanks go to Stephan Meyer, Anthony Mahler and Jason Morris for their help with the translations.  
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Through the piece of forest now, along its edge. Such a scanty little forest – 
however one walks, one always walks along the edge. And the forest as if 
emptied out. Rather as if just erected, you say to yourself. No roots? Without 
roots, the trees? Professionally put up by professionals. Quality forest. 
Guaranteed to last. Life-size. And secured with care. Like real. Directly almost 
like real! And so quiet, as if the earth, every spot of earth, the plants, the stones 
and every thing, as if all the world has long stopped speaking to us. And we 
then also to ourselves. Already for a long time. We do not answer! So quiet, but 
behind the quiet a hum, a growing hum. From all sides. And coming towards 
us. Or as inside one’s own head.4       
 
Kurzeck’s walk does not lead through a forest, but only through a piece of forest. A 
real forest is large and deep; you can enter deep into it. Such an inside does not exist 
in a piece of forest. A piece of forest is not a forest anymore. 
 
Between the trees in the piece of forest, there is nothing left, no undergrowth, no 
shrubs, no flowers. Even the trees do not look like real trees any more – they look 
more like fakes, highly praised in the excited language of advertising that culminates 
in the paradoxical cry: “Direkt beinah wie echt!”/“Directly almost like real!” 
 
We are unable to resonate with such trees, with such a piece of forest, with such highly 
artificial nature. It seems that in a world like this, we also have stopped resonating 
with and between ourselves. Yet, behind this dead quiet, the cars on the motorway are 
roaring louder and louder. The machine world seems to be the only thing that still 
grows as nature used to grow. The machine world threatens us. It intoxicates us.   
 
 
I. Environmental ethics and aesthetics: A map 
 
This section sketches in the briefest manner possible an answer to the complex 
question of what kind of value nature has, so as to indicate where in the wider 
landscape of environmental ethics the aesthetic argument is located. The critical 
                                                 
4 Peter Kurzeck, Als Gast (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2012), 191-192. 
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taxonomy of natural values that will be presented is a summary of my 1999 United 
Nations study, Ethics of Nature.5 
 
As this taxonomy shows, there are many arguments for the conservation of nature. 
Thus, the aesthetic argument does not have to carry all the burden of justification. Its 
role is limited but important, more important than most people tend to think. This is 
because the argument provides a metaphysically innocent understanding of our feeling 
that we are part of nature and should try to fit in rather than stand out. It serves to 
underpin in a deeply humanistic fashion our horror at the ever-growing grey crust that 
threatens to cover all of the earth’s surface.  
 
The taxonomy lists three kinds of natural values: an instrumental, a moral intrinsic, 
and a “eudemonic” intrinsic value. 
 
1. Instrumental value 
The fact that nature has instrumental value in that, for example, it satisfies basic 
human needs today and in the future, is obvious. Nature’s instrumental value is what 
underlies the ideal of sustainability, which is widely accepted in theory but not yet in 
practice. 
 
2. Moral intrinsic value 
It is, however, doubtful that nature bears any moral intrinsic value or dignity such as 
we accord to all human beings. To extend the moral rights of humans to plants or 
landscapes does not seem to be the way to go, as the reasons given for this extension 
are not particularly convincing. 
 
The two main reasons given are the teleological argument, which stipulates that we 
should respect the so-called ends of nature,6 and the holistic argument, which proposes 
                                                 
5 Cf. Angelika Krebs, Ethics of Nature: A Map (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999); a shorter, German version is: 
Angelika Krebs, “Naturethik im Überblick,” in Naturethik: Grundtexte der gegenwärtigen tier- und 
ökoethischen Diskussion, ed. Angelika Krebs (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), 337-379.  
6 For classical versions of this argument, cf. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1979), English: The Imperative of Responsibility (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1984); Klaus-Michael Meyer-Abich, Wege zum Frieden mit der Natur (München: dtv, 1984); and 
Holmes Rolston, Environmental Ethics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988). 
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that we overcome our dualistic ontology and realize that we are nothing but equal 
members of the natural community.7 
 
The first of these – the teleological argument – fails to convince since only free agents 
can follow and care about ends. The ends of nature are more like the ends of machines 
and would be better called functions. A personal computer does not care whether or 
not it manages to print out a text. The AIDS virus does not care whether or not it kills 
a person. The merely functional ends of nature are of no direct moral relevance. 
 
The holistic argument leads us even further into the swamp of metaphysics with 
potentially misanthropic or eco-fascist consequences. If mankind is nothing but an 
equal part of the natural system, why not get rid of it since it threatens to damage or 
even destroy the entire system like a cancerous tumor? 
 
Apart from the well-being of animals, there seems to be nothing in nature that 
demands moral respect. Moral rights must be extended to sentient animals, but no 
further.8 
 
3. Eudemonic intrinsic value 
Even if non-sentient nature does not bear any moral intrinsic value, it has another 
important kind of intrinsic value, namely eudemonic intrinsic value: nature plays a 
non-instrumental role in a good human life (“eudemonic” from Greek “eudaemonia” = 
happiness). Another name for this type of value is “relational”; the value in question 
lies in a particular, non-utilitarian relation we can have with nature.9 Some of the best 
reasons and motives for the protection of nature are relational or eudemonic. It was 
not moral respect for trees that drove masses of people to protest against the cutting 
down of trees in Stuttgart (“Stuttgart 21”) or in Taksim Square in Istanbul. The 
                                                 
7 Cf. e.g. Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), the deep ecology movement (which Naess founded), ecofeminism 
as well as posthumanism. 
8 For a more recent statement of the pathocentric argument made popular by Peter Singer, Animal 
Liberation (New York: HarperCollins, 1975) and by Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), see Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, 
Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
9 Cf. Damian Cox, “On the value of natural relations,” Environmental Ethics 19, 1997, 173-183. Cox’s 
model of a non-utilitarian relation is friendship. Strangely enough, he classifies aesthetic value as 
utilitarian and not as relational. 
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eudemonic intrinsic value of nature is threefold: nature has beauty (1.), it gives us a 
sense of identity (2.) and it is sacred (3.). 
 
3.1. Beauty 
Nature – in its variability and contingency – is a particularly inviting and rewarding 
object of non-instrumental aesthetic attention. It has aesthetic intrinsic value; it is 
beautiful in the broad sense of the term. Nature does not possess this value as such; 
rather, it is a value for us: We enjoy experiencing nature for its own sake.10 
 
3.2. Identity 
The second type of eudemonic intrinsic value in nature concerns our individual and 
collective identity, which tends to be rooted in the places where we live. When asked 
who they are, many people answer by reference to where they come from or what they 
have adopted as their “Wahlheimat,” be it the Black Forest, the Ruhr, the Scottish 
Highlands, or the Midwest. Like the desire for beauty, the need to put down roots 
somewhere is an anthropological constant. 
 
Great works of art, like Marcel Proust’s Recherche du temps perdu, James Joyce’s 
Ulysses, Edgar Reitz’ Heimat-Trilogie or Peter Kurzeck’s Vorabend testify to this 
need. In particular, refugees such as the Austrian-Jewish writer Jean Améry, “qualified 
homeless person,” or Peter Kurzeck, who was deported from the Sudetenland to 
Hessia, vouch for the value of “Heimat.” Améry answers the title question of his 
seminal essay “How Much Home Does a Person Need?” with: “he needs much home, 
more at any rate than a world of people with a homeland, whose entire pride is their 
cosmopolitan vacation fun, can dream of.”11 
                                                 
10 See Martin Seel, Eine Ästhetik der Natur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991); Arnold Berleant, The 
Aesthetics of the Environment (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); Gernot Böhme, 
Atmosphäre (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995); Raimund Rodewald, Sehnsucht Landschaft (Zürich: 
Chronos, 1999); Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment (London: Routledge, 2000); Malcolm 
Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Kurt-H. Weber, 
Die literarische Landschaft (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010); and Roger Scruton, Green Philosophy (London: 
Atlantic, 2012). The position developed in my paper is close to those of Martin Seel and Roger Scruton. 
11 Cf. Jean Améry, “Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch?” in Jean Améry, Werke 2 (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2002), 86-117, English: “How Much Home Does a Person Need?” in Jean Améry, At the Mind’s 
Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1980), 60. See also Hermann Lübbe, “Identität durch Geschichte,” in Hermann Lübbe, 
Geschichtsbegriff und Geschichtsinteresse (Basel: Schwabe, 1977), 145-154; Karen Joisten, 
Philosophie der Heimat – Heimat der Philosophie (Berlin: Akademie, 2003); and, again, Roger 
Scruton, Green Philosophy (London: Atlantic, 2012). 
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3.3. Sacredness 
The third type of eudemonic intrinsic value in nature is a generalized version of the 
first one. It generalizes the aesthetic attitude towards the beautiful to an attitude 
towards the whole of one’s life and one’s world.  
 
As the great mystics and the world's religions teach, the best attitude towards one’s 
life takes into account the role of fate in life and does not make the meaning of life 
dependent on successfully achieving some fundamental ends, finding a spouse, or 
having a career, since one might fail to achieve these ends. In such cases, one’s life 
would be devoid of meaning. The wise attitude towards life takes life itself as the 
meaning of life. The wise person reveres nature as part of life. Whoever manages to 
experience life as intrinsically valuable or sacred feels the true joy of living, 
beatitude.12 
 
In table one below, you see the three classes of value in nature: first, the 
anthropocentric instrumental value; second, the anthropocentric eudemonic intrinsic 
value; and third, the physiocentric moral intrinsic value. In what follows, I will only 
explore what represents the center of the table: the aesthetic argument. I am not even 
able to address all that falls under this heading, so I will concentrate on landscapes and 
their beauty. 
 
                                                 
The identity argument justifies the conservation of nature where nature is in fact part of the home of 
people. Yet, as more and more people grow up in and live in cities and feel at home there, the identity 
argument becomes weaker and weaker with time. This is not the case for the aesthetic argument, which 
has universal power. 
12 For such a nontranscendent interpretation of the religious attitude, see Friedrich Kambartel, 
“Bemerkungen zu Verständnis und Wahrheit religiöser Rede und Praxis,” in Friedrich Kambartel, 
Philosophie der humanen Welt (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 100-103; and Hans Julius Schneider, 
“William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein: A philosophical approach to spirituality,” in Spirituality and 
Counseling, eds. Judith Moore and Campbell Purton (Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books, 2006), 50-64. 
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II. The concept of landscape 
 
To clarify the concept of landscape we must first look at the concept of nature. As 
Aristotle already taught in his Physics, nature is that part of the world which has not 
been made by human beings but comes into existence and vanishes by virtue of itself. 
As Peter Kurzeck puts it rather pointedly: Nature is what grows by itself and what, for 
that very reason, is removed (“was von allein wächst, wird weggemacht”13). Artifacts 
are the opposites of nature in this sense; they are made by human beings. The 
distinction between nature and artifacts is polar or gradual (like the distinction 
between light and dark) and not binary or dichotomous (like the distinction between 
being pregnant and not pregnant); one cannot be a little bit pregnant but it can be more 
or less light or dark. There is hardly any untouched nature on earth anymore. Most of 
what we call nature, the conservation of which we are concerned with, lies, in fact, 
between the extremes of pure nature and pure artifact. It is a mix of the natural and the 
artificial in which the natural aspect prevails. 
                                                 
13 Peter Kurzeck, Oktober und wer wir selbst sind (Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 2007), 41. 
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In nature, we can distinguish natural organisms and things (like plants and rocks) from 
larger natural units (like landscapes). Although most landscapes today are cultivated 
and not wild, they are not necessarily less beautiful; consider, for example, the garden-
like English landscape. 
 
There is no sharp boundary between landscapes and gardens (or parks), as again 
England with its landscape gardens shows. Gardens are, first, laid out for aesthetic 
enjoyment and in this respect they fall somewhere between art and nature; second, 
they usually surround a house and are themselves surrounded by a fence, so that they 
mediate between the house and the landscape.14 
 
Landscapes are especially pertinent to the experience of natural resonance. This is 
because they are relatively free from human ends. Yet one can certainly also resonate 
                                                 
14 Cf. David Cooper, A Philosophy of Gardens (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006). Sara Miller’s The Garden as 
an Art (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993) puts the emphasis on the first of the two 
criteria. For the history of gardens, see Marie Luise Gothein, Geschichte der Gartenkunst (Jena: Eugen 
Diederichs, 1926); and Albert Lutz, Gärten der Welt (Zürich: Museum Rietberg, 2016).  
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with nature in gardens and parks, as well as with singular organisms and natural 
things.15 But let us focus here on landscapes.16 
 
To understand landscapes as larger natural units is only one of many ways of 
understanding them. This modest, everyday understanding (1.), which I opt for here, 
must be distinguished from two more demanding aesthetic ones (2. and 3.). The reason 
why I prefer the first understanding will emerge in the next section (III.). 
 
1. Larger natural unit 
In twelfth-century Old High German, “lantscaf” denoted a larger natural area and its 
population. In fifteenth-century Netherlands, the term could also refer to a painting of 
a larger natural unit. Art historians still talk of landscapes in these terms. Today, the 
boundaries of landscapes are no longer political, as they were in the beginning and as 
the German synonym “Gebiet” (from “gebieten” = to rule) makes explicit. As I 
suggest in the next section on “Stimmung,” for us it is atmosphere that constitutes the 
unity of landscapes. 
 
                                                 
15 Peter Kurzeck gives many examples of resonating with individual natural beings as well. One such 
example cites lime trees in summer (Peter Kurzeck, Vorabend, Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 2011, 867), 
another cites swallows in the morning: “Die Schwalben kommen nicht mehr ins Dorf. Erstens kein 
Platz mehr für sie. Und zwotens – weil sie keiner mehr will. Hat niemand mehr Freude an ihnen. Sind 
zuletzt noch einmal gekommen und dann gleich wieder weg. Ohne Abschied weg. Und haben doch 
durch die Jahrhunderte mit uns gelebt. Ohne Schwalben, sagte ich, aber wer weiß das noch? Ohne 
Schwalben gibt es kein Glück im Haus. Überhaupt die Vögel, sagte ich. In Scharen. Bachstelzchen, 
Rotkehlchen, Rotschwänzchen, Meisen und Spatzen. Als Kind, sagte ich. Schon am Morgen. Was für 
eine Freude. Man kommt aus dem Haus und überall Leben. Alles lebendig. Alles atmet und lebt. Du bist 
vier oder fünf und weißt schon ganz genau, du gehörst mit zum Leben dazu. Und jetzt? Beton, Kacheln, 
Glastüren, Glasziegel, Preßglas, Eternit, Kunststoffe, Eisen, ein Spuk. Wie neu. Und bleibt auch wie 
neu. Immer frisch verputzt. Weiß, sauber, ordentlich, läßt sich gut sauber halten. Alles genormt. Grell 
das Lampenlicht drauf. Und die ganze Nacht ein elektrisches Surren. Die Klimaanlage. Das Licht. Die 
Alarmanlage. Eine Überwachungskamera. Flutlicht wie vom Mond.” (Peter Kurzeck, Vorabend, 
Frankfurt: Stroemfeld 2011 , 608). In English translation: “The swallows no longer come into the 
village. Firstly, no longer any place for them. And secondly – because no one wants them anymore. No 
one takes joy in them anymore. Came once more, lately, and then immediately gone again. Without 
farewell gone. And still, have lived with us throughout the centuries. Without swallows, said I, but who 
still knows that? Without swallows there is no joy in the house. The birds, in general, said I. In flocks. 
White wagtails, robins, black redstarts, tits and sparrows. As a child, said I. Already in the morning. 
What a pleasure. One comes out of the house and everywhere life. Everything alive. Everything 
breathes and lives. You are four or five and already know exactly, you belong to life. And now? 
Concrete, tiles, glass doors, glass bricks, moulded glass, cemented asbestos, artificial materials, iron –  
spooky. Like new. And also stays like new. Always freshly plastered. White, clean, orderly, can easily 
be kept clean. Everything normed. Glaring the lamplight on it. And the whole night an electric buzz. 
The air conditioner. The light. The alarm system. A surveillance camera. Floodlight as if from the 
moon.” 
16 Landscapes in the literal sense are natural landscapes. There are also landscapes in the metaphorical 
sense: urban landscapes, philosophical landscapes (like environmental ethics, the map of which I have 
drawn in the last section) and “Sofalandschaften.” 
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2. Larger natural unit in aesthetic contemplation 
According to this aesthetic understanding, you encounter landscapes only when you 
attend to what is around you for its own sake. You do not experience landscapes when 
all you are looking for is recreation or research. 
 
3. Larger natural unit in autonomous aesthetic contemplation 
This even more demanding aesthetic understanding is closely associated with Joachim 
Ritter’s well-known article on landscape aesthetics.17 For Ritter, the phenomenon of 
landscape begins with Petrarch’s ascent of Mont Ventoux in 1336, since in this 
excursion and its literary reflection Petrarch attended to nature as such and not only to 
nature as the book of God. Most contemporary landscape theorists, at least in 
Germany, follow Ritter.18 
 
However, it could be argued that a contemplation of landscape that has not yet 
emancipated itself from the religious or metaphysical worldview is also an aesthetic 
contemplation, albeit not a pure but a symbolic one. After all, these pre-Enlightenment 
people did not just see letters in the book of God but rivers, valleys and hills. 
Consider, for example, the locus amoenus in Plato’s Phaedrus.19 
 
 
III. The concept of “Stimmung” 
 
This section presents “Stimmung” or atmosphere as the unifying principle of 
landscapes, taking up a proposal that Georg Simmel made in his classic piece on the 
philosophy of landscape a hundred years ago. It then documents the alarming pace of 
landscape destruction, for example in Germany and Switzerland after the Second 
World War.  
 
                                                 
17 Cf. Joachim Ritter, “Landschaft: Zur Funktion des Ästhetischen in der modernen Gesellschaft,” in 
Joachim Ritter, Subjektivität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), 141–166. See also Georg Simmel, 
“Philosophie der Landschaft,” in Georg Simmel, Aufsätze und Abhandlungen 1909–1918 (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 2001), 471–482, English: “The Philosophy of Landscape,” Theory, Culture and Society 24, 
2007, 20–29. 
18 E.g. Martin Seel, Eine Ästhetik der Natur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 221; or Thomas Kirchhoff 
and Ludwig Trepl, Vieldeutige Natur (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009). 
19 On the appreciation of landscape in antiquity, see Winfried Elliger, Die Darstellung der Landschaft in 
der griechischen Dichtung (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975). 
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The German word “Stimmung” (from Old High German “stimma” = voice) is 
untranslatable (arguably more untranslatable than “Heimat” where being at home at 
least comes close). “Stimmung” embraces three phenomena while its English and 
French counterparts (“mood,” “attunement,” “ambiance,” “atmosphere,” “humeur,” 
“état d’âme,” “accord,” etc.) usually embrace only one or two. The three phenomena 
are harmony, mood, and atmosphere.20 
 
1. Harmony 
Being in tune or in harmony is the original sixteenth century meaning of “Stimmung.” 
Musical instruments were said to be in tune or integrated and ready to be played, and 
later, in the eighteenth century, the same was said about the faculties of the human 
soul. Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgement famously talks about the harmony 
(“proportionierte Stimmung”) of the faculties of imagination and understanding 
(“Einbildungskraft und Verstand”) in aesthetic contemplation. 
 
2. Mood 
Moods belong to the sphere of mental human feeling; they are not just bodily feelings 
such as toothache, nausea or fatigue, although they are sometimes regarded as that. In 
contrast to standard mental feelings or emotions (rage, sorrow or joy), which are 
directed at something or other in particular, moods (sadness or cheerfulness) have no 
specific objects, but are rather about life and the world at large. Moods integrate us. 
The musical metaphor of “Stimmung” as introduced in the last paragraph highlights 
the holistic character of moods. Moods synthesize what we feel into a more or less 
harmonious whole. They ensure that we hang together affectively and don’t fall to 
pieces. Nevertheless, there are times when we do fall to pieces, and in this sense, we 
are not always in a mood. Given their integrating function, moods can be regarded as 
the affective counterparts to reason. Just as reason overcomes the one-sidedness and 
often tyranny of particular standards of rationality (e.g. instrumental or moral 
rationality) and goes for an “all things considered” holistic judgement, moods may 
                                                 
20 Cf. Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation 
of the Word “Stimmung” (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1963); David Wellbery, “Stimmung,” in 
Ästhetische Grundbegriffe 5, ed. Karlheinz Buck et al. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2003), 703-733; Hans Ulrich 
Gumbrecht, Stimmungen lesen (München: Hanser, 2011), English: Atmosphere, Mood, Stimmung 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), chapter one; and Friederike Reents, Stimmungsästhetik 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015), especially 13-16. 
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overcome the restricted agenda and often dominance of particular emotions and 
establish a balanced affective synthesis. 
 
As with emotions, there are two major kinds of moods: transitory (as in “moody”) and 
enduring. Unlike the connotation of “mood” in English, which privileges the first 
kind, “Stimmung” is wider and refers equally to the second kind. The so-called 
“Grundstimmungen” are longer lasting and more reliable or world-disclosing than the 
short-term and capricious “Launen.” 
 
Apart from their integrating function, which is central to our topic, moods also differ 
from emotions in many other ways. Table two below contrasts moods with typical 
acute emotions. The table employs eight characteristics; besides intentionality and 
cause, these are duration, intensity, dynamics, mode of awareness, influence on 
cognition and link to behavior. It is intended as a fairly uncontroversial survey of how 
the philosophical and psychological mainstream as well as ordinary language 
generally perceive the contrasts.21  
 
With regard to their duration, both transitory and enduring moods tend to last longer 
than acute emotions; with regard to their intensity, all moods tend to be milder; with 
regard to their dynamics, they tend to be more stationary; with regard to the mode of 
awareness, they tend to linger in the background; with regard to their influence on 
cognition, they tend to color all we perceive and think; and with regard to their link to 
behavior, they tend to be only indirectly motivating. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 For philosophical treatises, see Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Das Wesen der Stimmungen (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1995); Peter Goldie, The Emotions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), chapter 
seven; Matthew Ratcliffe, Feelings of Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); as well as the 
special issue of Philosophia: The Meaning of Moods, 2017, eds. Angelika Krebs and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev. 
For a psychological survey, see Christopher Breedie, Peter Terry and Andrew Lane, “Distinctions 
between mood and emotion,” Cognition and Consciousness 19, 2005, 847-874.  
Affective disorders orders such as clinical depression, paranoia and schizophrenia seem to stand 
between emotions and moods in many respects. 
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Typical characteristics Emotions 
(anger, sexual desire 
etc.) 
Moods 
(happiness, sadness 
etc.) 
1. Intentionality: 
What are they about? 
Something specific Life and the world at 
large 
2. Cause: 
What induces them? 
Specific events Cause is less well 
defined 
3. Duration: 
How long do they last? 
Seconds, minutes, 
hours or days (for 
acute emotions) – 
weeks, months or years 
(for enduring emotions) 
Hours or days (for 
transitory moods) – 
weeks, months or years 
(for enduring moods) 
4. Intensity: 
How strong is the 
feeling? 
Intense (at least for 
acute emotions) 
Milder, more moderate 
than in emotions 
5. Dynamics: 
What motion do they 
have? 
Dynamic (at least for 
acute emotions) 
Stationary, a kind of 
equilibrium 
6. Mode of awareness: 
Are they felt in the 
foreground or in the 
background? 
In the foreground (at 
least for acute 
emotions) 
In the background 
7. Influence on 
cognition: 
How much do they color 
what we see and think? 
Limited effect Pervasive effect 
(“mood congruence”) 
8. Link to behavior: How 
motivating are they? 
Directly motivating Indirect, loose link to 
behavior 
 
In light of the eight characteristics noted here, we can regard acute emotions as 
eruptive peaks on a continuum of moods. Both emotions and moods can be classified 
as positive/pleasant or negative/unpleasant. Moods in particular are often described as 
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high or low, full or empty, deep or shallow, centrifugal or centripetal, calm or tense, 
energetic or tired. Needless to say, there are many transitions between moods and 
emotions. A general irritation, for example, can turn into a specific anger and vice 
versa. 
 
Moods and emotions are directed towards the world. When they are inverted – that is, 
sought for and enjoyed for their own sake – they can degenerate into states such as 
kitsch and sentimentality in which an element of dishonesty or even deceit facilitates 
easy gratification.22 
 
Moods and emotions can be shared among human beings. Such inter-human or 
collective affects, be they the result of infection as in mass panic, or of true – that is, 
sympathetic or dialogical – sharing, are also called collective “atmospheres.”23 In 
addition to such inter-human atmospheres, there are also nonhuman atmospheres 
(which in turn can be shared by us via infection or sympathy, as will be explored later 
in section V.). 
 
3. Atmosphere 
When nonhuman entities such as landscapes, cities, buildings or rooms are said to 
have aura or atmosphere, they are regarded not only as integrated wholes (as in 1.) but 
also as full of feeling, e.g. as full of peace or melancholy (as in 2.). The atmospheres 
of landscapes change with the weather, the time of day and the season. These 
transitory atmospheres can be distinguished from the more enduring atmosphere, 
gestalt or character of landscapes. The character of landscapes depends on their 
physiognomy, climate and history. Both the enduring and the transitory atmospheres 
of landscapes are not merely subjective phenomena, even if subjective factors like 
personal memories and personal moods also play a role in actual landscape 
experience.24 
                                                 
22 See, besides Bollnow, Das Wesen der Stimmungen (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), 49-54: 
Michael Tanner, “Sentimentality,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77, 1976/77, 127-147; and 
Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 485-488, as well as 
“A Point of View: The Strangely Enduring Power of Kitsch,” BBC News, 2014 (online).  
23 Cf. Angelika Krebs, Zwischen Ich und Du (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2015), which uses insights from the 
debate on joint action (the main protagonists of which are Margaret Gilbert, John Searle and Michael 
Bratman) in order to further the understanding affective sharing. 
24 See Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Mensch und Raum (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963), English: Human 
Space (London: Hyphen Press, 2011); Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci (New York: Rizzoli, 
1980); Marc Augé, Non-Lieux (Le Seuil: Librairie du XXe siècle, 1992), English: Non-Places (London: 
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Landscape character is the principle of unity behind the first, modest concept of 
landscape in section II. As not all experiences of atmospheric larger natural units are 
aesthetic rather than hedonistic or scientific, the two more demanding, aesthetic 
concepts of landscape in section II. do indeed seem too narrow. 
 
Where a large natural area loses its character through a natural catastrophe or human 
destruction, it lacks the unity necessary for being a landscape. It turns into an 
expressionless heterogeneity, into a non-place or landscape garbage. It does not turn 
into an ugly “landscape.” Ugly landscapes are the opposites of aesthetically attractive 
and, in this broad sense, beautiful landscapes.  
 
Not every landscape change amounts to landscape destruction. The change can also be 
for the good. The Golden Gate Bridge, which spans the Golden Gate Strait between 
San Francisco Bay and the Pacific Ocean, might be an example of the latter. Still, 
much of what goes on around us does amount to landscape destruction.  
 
A scientific study that documents this is Klaus Ewald’s and Gregor Klaus’s 2009 
monumental geographical work on the changing Swiss countryside, Die 
ausgewechselte Landschaft. The photographs on the back cover of this book indicate 
what Switzerland, which once was so beautiful, looks like in many places today: 
leveled, plot aligned, drained, regulated, hypertrophied, devoid of species diversity, 
obstructed, destroyed by urban sprawl, illuminated, cut open, channeled, covered in 
artificial snow, over-travelled, and wired.25 
 
An artistic exemplification of landscape destruction is Jörg Müller’s set of pictures, 
Alle Jahre wieder saust der Presslufthammer nieder (“Every year the jackhammer’s 
pounding returns”).26 Below are four of the seven pictures in this series. 
                                                 
Verso, 1995); Gernot Böhme, Atmosphäre (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995); Edward Casey, The Fate of 
Place (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Hermann Schmitz, Der Leib, der Raum und die 
Gefühle (Ostfeldern: arcaden, 1998); and Thomas Fuchs, Leib, Raum, Person (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
2000). 
25 Cf. Klaus Ewald and Gregor Klaus, Die ausgewechselte Landschaft: Vom Umgang der Schweiz mit 
ihrer wichtigsten natürlichen Ressource (Bern: Haupt, 2009).  
26 Cf. Jörg Müller, Alle Jahre wieder saust der Presslufthammer nieder (Aarau: Sauerländer, 1973). 
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These pictures show a typical Swiss countryside and how it changed between the 
years 1953 and 1972. Can you guess what season it is in the various pictures?  
 
In the first picture it is obviously springtime, the fruit tree in the middle of the picture 
is in full bloom; in the second picture it is autumn, the tree’s leaves are yellow. But 
what about the season in the last picture? It is difficult to tell, isn’t it? For nothing 
much remains of nature. The trees, meadows and fields are gone, the cows are gone, as 
are the brook and the pond. All that remains is the grass. And grass is green all year 
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round. As it happens, it is autumn, the mini-tree planted on the roof of the discount 
store has yellow leaves. 
 
To complement the education of the eyes with some education of the ears, I would 
have liked to play to you now, if only I could, two passages from Peter Kurzeck’s 
audio book Ein Sommer, der bleibt (“A summer that lasts”). In these passages Kurzeck 
talks freely, not reading from a manuscript, and describes how the valley of his youth, 
near the Hessian village Staufenberg, was destroyed by the construction of a 
motorway.  
 
The first passage, “The valley that disappeared,” gives a picture of the valley. It is 
beautiful, you feel at home in it. You can walk around, look around and just be there 
for its own sake. The second passage, “The motorway,” shows the loss. There is 
nothing to see in the valley anymore. You can no longer walk there. You can only 
drive. You can’t stay there because of the all-embracing noise; there is a permanent 
roaring. This is no longer a world for people. It is a world for cars. Here are the two 
passages, first in a German transcript and then in English translation: 
 
Das verschwundene Tal 
 
Der Weg zur Lahn ging durch ein sehr schönes Tal. Er war am, am 
Westabhang des Berges, da standen schon keine Häuser mehr. Also das Dorf 
eigentlich erstreckte sich nach Süden hin – nach Süden und Südosten. Und an 
diesem West- oder Nordwestabhang waren eigentlich nur noch – erst noch 
Gärten – und dann war eine Wildnis und dazwischen gingen ein paar 
Treppengässchen den Berg herunter. Und, äh, das Land war mit / also die Erde 
war mit, mit Mauern eigentlich wurde die gehalten, also terrassenförmig 
angelegt. Mit alten Feldsteinmauern, die zum Teil lose aufgeschichtet waren 
und zum Teil eben grob gemauert. Da gingen ein paar Treppengässchen runter, 
dann konnte man auf die Straße nach Odenhausen kommen, und es gab sehr, 
sehr schöne Wegraine eigentlich und große Hecken und Erlengehölze und, und 
überall floss dann im Frühling noch Wasser – also kleine Bächlein, die im Lauf 
des Sommers versiegten. 
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Das ganze Tal, das nach Westen ging, das war wie, wie ein altes Bild 
eigentlich, wie, wie der Hintergrund eines Heiligenbildes oder so. Es war 
voller Gärten und Wassergräben und Fischteichen vom Dorf bis an die 
Chaussee. Und jenseits der Chaussee waren dann Wiesen und Felder bis zu 
den, bis zum Bahndamm, der, äh, zugleich eine Art Deich war, gegen / aber 
weiter kam das Hochwasser dann eben nicht. Und dieses ganze Tal ist jetzt 
mittlerweile zugebaut. Es ist eigentlich total eingenommen von einer Autobahn 
und einer Autobahnabfahrt. Man merkt dann erst wie riesig, also wie viel Platz 
so eine Autobahn braucht. Und vor allem auch eine Abfahrt oder eine 
Autobahnkreuzung geht weit ins Land rein eigentlich – es ist überhaupt nichts 
mehr übrig. So lang, so lang es das Tal gab und so lang ich in Staufenberg 
wohnte, bin ich jeden Tag wenigstens einmal dort gegangen, weil da am 
Nachmittag und am Abend auch das Licht am schönsten ist. Man sieht dann 
die Berge und Wälder im Westen, hinter denen die Sonne untergeht. Und im 
Frühsommer geht sie weit im Norden unter und bei einer bestimmten 
Lichtkonstellation kann man das Rothaargebirge sehen, das man eigentlich 
nicht sieht von Staufenberg aus.  
 
 
Die Autobahn 
 
Und als ich dort weg bin, das heißt 1977, da war es so, dass man / dass ein 
großer Teil der Stadtautobahn des Gießener Rings schon fertig war. Und der 
sollte ja neue Anschlüsse zu neuen Autobahnen auch gleichzeitig bieten. Das 
heißt, man hat überall Schnellstraßen und Autobahnen und Autobahnteilstücke 
schon gebaut und das Tal, das zur Lahn hin ging, von dem ich sprach, dieses 
Tal war noch da, aber man wusste, es sind seine letzten Tage, man muss jeden 
Abend da gehen um es, um es nochmal zu sehen. Um zu sehen, wie die 
Wassergräben zwischen den Flüchtlingsgärten leuchten, Wassergräben zur 
Bewässerung, die voller Blutegel waren, und die Fischteiche und die Brunnen, 
die es da alle gab. Brunnen mit schönen Dächern, zum Teil sogar mit 
gewölbten Steindächern.  
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Und als wir wegzogen, da war es so, dass die Autobahn gebaut wurde, also 
dieses Teilstück der Autobahn direkt unterhalb von Staufenberg, das das ganze 
Tal ausfüllt und seither hört man unentwegt Tag und Nacht im Dorf die (...) / 
den Lärm von der Autobahn. Also ein ständiges Rauschen, das man im ganzen 
Dorf hört. Stille gibt es eigentlich nicht mehr. Man kann mittlerweile das Dorf 
nicht mehr / also man, man kann nicht mehr nach Westen aus dem Dorf gehen, 
ohne dass man, dass man dazu verurteilt ist unter der Autobahn irgendwie 
durchzukriechen eigentlich. Wenn man nach Lollar geht, dann überquert man 
die Autobahn. Da ist ein Stück Horizont abgegraben. Das heißt, wenn man ein 
Gedächtnis hat – was einem ja abgewöhnt werden soll – wenn man ein 
Gedächtnis hat, dann hat man den Eindruck, da fehlt ein Stück, ein Stück von 
der Erde. Und man muss diese Autobahn überqueren, es gibt auch nichts mehr 
zu sehen eigentlich. Wege (...), die zu meinen Kindheitswegen gehörten wie 
der zum Daublinger Bahnhof, wo man wusste, man geht jetzt durch 
Kornfelder, sieht kleine Wäldchen. Und wenn man morgens geht, weil man ja 
in die Schule fahren muss mit dem Zug, dann sieht man überall Rehe. Und 
jetzt ist da ja überhaupt nichts mehr – da ist zwischen den Dörfern kein Land 
übrig geblieben. Und eigentlich wirklich gut und in Ruhe kann man aus dem 
Dorf raus nur noch nach Nordosten gehen. Das ist der Weg zum Friedhof und 
zugleich der Weg, der zu dem entfernteren Wald führt. Zu dem großen Wald, 
von dem wir in den ersten Jahren nach dem Krieg gelebt haben, alle 
Flüchtlinge eigentlich. Und mittlerweile fahren die Leute mit Autos an diesen 
Waldrand, zum Joggen. Das heißt, sie gehen nicht dahin oder so, sondern sie 
fahren mit dem Auto an den Waldrand, joggen und fahren dann mit dem Auto 
zurück und gucken, ob sie’s noch zum Fernsehen für die Vorabendkrimiserien 
schaffen. Und der ganze Gießener Ring, diese Stadtautobahn geht eigentlich 
auf die Vorabendkrimiserien zurück, weil die Leute die ganzen Fünfziger- und 
Sechzigerjahre hindurch im Fernsehen diese Serien gesehen haben, in denen es 
Stadtautobahnen gibt – also amerikanische Serien – und dann haben sie diese 
Stadtautobahnen gebaut. Und ich glaube in, in den Köpfen, in ihren eigenen 
Köpfen spielen die Leute jetzt diese Vorabendserien nach. Man weiß nur nie, 
welche Rolle einer hat, entweder ist er auf der Flucht – jahrelang schon auf der 
Flucht – oder er nimmt jedes Mal, wenn er ins Auto steigt, wieder die 
Verfolgung auf oder plant umsichtig, äh, einen Amoklauf. 
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The valley that disappeared 
 
The path towards the Lahn went through a beautiful valley. It led along… 
along the western slope of the mountain; there were already no houses 
anymore. Well the village, actually, extended to the south – to south and 
southeast. And along this western or northwestern slope there were really only 
– at first only gardens – and then there was a wilderness, and in between a few 
narrow stairways leading down the mountain. And, er, the land was… well, the 
earth was held… was held in place with walls, laid out terraced. With old stone 
walls that were sometimes held together by crude masonry and other times 
loosely stacked. There, a few stairways lead downwards, from which one could 
reach the road to Odenhausen, and there were very, very beautiful waysides, 
really, and large shrubs and alder groves and… and, in spring, water would 
flow everywhere – small streams that would dry up during the course of 
summer. 
 
The entire valley with its westward leaning, it was like… like an old painting, 
really, like… like the background for a picture of a saint or something like that. 
It was full of gardens and moats and fish ponds, reaching from the village all 
the way to the chaussee. And then, beyond the chaussee, there were fields and 
meadows up to the… to the embankment that, er, was also a sort of dike 
against… / … but stopped the high water from getting any further. And 
meanwhile, this entire valley is spoilt by development. It is, in fact, completely 
dominated by a motorway and its exit. Only then does one begin to realize how 
huge… that is, how much space such a motorway requires. And especially 
exits or highway crossings, they reach so far into the countryside, really – there 
is absolutely nothing left. As long… as long as there was still a valley, and as 
long as I have lived in Staufenberg, I went there at least once every day, 
because, during the afternoon and also the evening, the light is at its most 
beautiful there. One can then see the mountains and forests towards the west, 
behind which the sun sets. And, in early summer, the sun sets so far in the 
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north and, during a particular constellation of light, one can see the Rothaar 
Mountains, which normally can’t be seen from Staufenberg. 
 
 
The motorway 
 
And when I left, that is 1977, it was… one had… / a substantial part of the 
motorway of the Gießener ring road had already been completed. And it was 
also meant to allow new connections to new motorways. This means that they 
had already built express roads, and highways, and highway segments 
everywhere, and the valley that lead towards the Lahn, of which I have spoken, 
that valley was still there, but one knew that it was in its last remaining days, 
one has to go there every evening in order… in order to see it one more time. 
In order to see how the ditches shine between the gardens of the refugees, 
ditches for watering that were full of leeches, and the fish ponds and the wells 
that were all there. Wells with nice roofs, sometimes even with arched stone 
roofs. 
 
And when we moved away, the motorway was being built… well, this 
fragment of the motorway directly below Staufenberg that fills the entire 
valley, and ever since, in the village, one constantly hears, day and night, the 
(…) / the noise from the motorway. That is to say a perpetual buzz that can be 
heard across the village. There isn’t really any silence anymore. Meanwhile, 
one can no longer / well, one… one can’t leave the village to the west anymore 
without one… one being condemned, really, to somehow crawl under the 
motorway. If one goes to Lollar, then one crosses the motorway. A piece of 
horizon has been dug away there. That is to say that, if one has a memory – 
though they would have us unlearn it – if one has a memory, then one gets the 
impression that there’s a piece missing there, a piece of earth. And one has to 
cross this motorway, there is also nothing, really, to be seen. Paths (…) that 
belonged to the routes of my childhood, like the one to the Daublinger train 
station, where one knew one will now walk through the corn fields, see small 
woods. And when one leaves in the mornings because, after all, one has to take 
the train to school, then one sees deer everywhere. And now, there is 
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absolutely nothing there anymore – there is no land left between the villages. 
And, in fact, the only way to leave the village nicely and peacefully is to the 
northeast. That is the path to the graveyard and also the path that leads to the 
more distant forest. To the big forest, off which we lived during the first years 
after the war, all refugees, really. And nowadays, people drive to this forest 
with cars to go jogging. That is to say, they don’t go there or anything like that, 
but they drive to the edge of the woods by car, jog, and then drive back by car 
while thinking about whether they can make it to the television in time for the 
early evening crime series. And the entire Gießener ring road, this motorway, 
really boils down to the early evening crime series, because, throughout the 
fifties and sixties, the people were watching these series, in which there are 
motorways – that is to say, American series – and later they built these 
motorways. And I think that in… in the heads… in their own heads these 
people are now imitating these early evening series. Only one never knows 
which role someone has; maybe he is on the run – for years already on the run 
– or he takes up the chase again every time he steps into the car, or he carefully 
makes plans for, er, running amok.27 
 
The first passage begins like a fairy tale that you would tell a child: “The path towards 
the Lahn went through a beautiful valley.” The language is as simple as can be: 
“path,” “beautiful,” “valley”, “village,” “mountain,” “forest.” Nevertheless, the valley 
unfolds in great detail before our eyes, with its little terraces in the evening light, with 
its creeks and ditches. 
 
But when the motorway comes and occupies the valley like a foreign army, there is no 
walking anymore; it is only to the graveyard that you can still walk like a human 
being. In the other directions, you have to crawl like a beast. The space taken by the 
motorway in the valley is reflected in the space it occupies in the language, spreading 
like a disease in terms such as “express roads,” “highway sections,” “motorway 
junctions,” “exits,” “Gießener ring road.” The noise produced by the motorway is also 
echoed in the language: “a permanent buzz that can be heard across the village. There 
isn’t really any silence anymore.” This external and internal conquest is not merely 
reported by Kurzeck, it is rather that we can feel it directly as we listen to his voice. 
                                                 
27 Peter Kurzeck, Ein Sommer, der bleibt (Berlin: supposé, 2007), CD 2, passages 5 and 8. 
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How and why a world for people, however impoverished, was transformed into a 
world for cars is hinted at, in ironical exaggeration, towards the end of the second 
passage, where Kurzeck indicates how the early evening crime series brought the 
American way of life into the back rooms of even the remotest postwar German 
villages.28 
 
 
IV. How is “Stimmung” infused into landscape? 
 
Unlike human beings and many (other) animals, landscapes cannot feel anything in 
the literal sense. They do not have nervous systems. Nevertheless, we attribute moods 
such as peacefulness and melancholy to landscapes. (To a lesser degree, we also 
attribute bodily feelings, emotions, thoughts, and actions to landscapes.) The same 
holds for architectural units, for rooms, buildings, streets, neighborhoods and cities. It 
seems to hold also for artworks. Paintings, symphonies, poems and theatre plays all 
have their moods. They express them and do not merely, if they are both 
representational and expressive, represent them. Artworks and buildings – like 
landscapes – cannot feel anything in the literal sense. Why then do we attribute moods 
to them? On what basis? With what right? To repeat the question in Georg Simmel’s 
terms: “to what extent can the mood of a landscape be located within it, objectively, 
given that it is a mental state, and can thus reside alone in the emotional reflexes of the 
beholder and not in the unconscious external objects?”29 
                                                 
28 Kurzeck’s early novel Kein Frühling (“No Spring”) (Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 1987) paints a realistic 
picture of the impoverished world for people in the German countryside before modernisation. As 
Kurzeck explains in the first chapter, he wanted neither romanticism nor mere stocktaking: “Daß uns 
die verlorene Zeit nur nicht nachträglich noch zur Idylle mißrät und die Gegenwart, das Leben in der 
Mehrzahl bliebe eine Angelegenheit für Statistiker.” In English: “The lost time must not take on a 
nostalgic air in retrospect, and the present time, pluralistic as it is, must not degenerate into a merely 
statistical affair.” (10) 
No other work by Kurzeck brings out landscape destruction as well as Vorabend (Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 
2011). In chapter 42 (703-717), there is a particularly rich passage in which Kurzeck claims that we 
should not have given up the earth (“Wir hätten die Erde nicht aufgeben sollen,” 712) and asks how we 
can ever come to terms with the fact that something was good and then is not good anymore, that 
something was right before and then is made wrong. Also his posthumously published novel fragment 
Bis er kommt (“Until he comes”) (Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 2015) leaves us in no doubt about Kurzeck’s 
environmentalist position. If we are lucky, he writes on page 256, there will soon be no cars anymore 
and the highways will grow over in front of our eyes. For literary studies on Kurzeck’s œuvre, see Text 
und Kritik 199, 2013: Peter Kurzeck; and Christoph Riedel, Peter Kurzecks Erzählkosmos: Idylle –
Romantik – Blues (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2017). 
29 Georg Simmel, “The Philosophy of Landscape,” Theory, Culture and Society 24, 2007, 26-27. 
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There are many philosophical responses to this question, including that the question is 
misconceived. It is advisable to start with this last response before looking at four 
major explanations of how landscapes “acquire” moods: the projective, the causal, the 
associative, and the metaphorical models. 
 
Phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Hermann 
Schmitz, and Gernot Böhme maintain that asking how “Stimmung” is infused into 
landscape is the wrong question to ask. “Stimmung” is already out there. When we 
move in landscapes we enter their “Stimmungen”; the phenomenon of “Stimmung” 
lies before the divide between subject and world. Here is a quote from Otto Friedrich 
Bollnow’s classic Das Wesen der Stimmungen from 1941: 
 
In “Stimmung,” the world has not yet become an object, as it does afterwards 
in the later forms of consciousness, especially in knowing; rather, 
“Stimmungen” still live entirely in the unseparated unity of self and world, 
with a shared colouring of “Stimmung” pervading both. That is why it is also 
wrong to assign “Stimmung” solely to the subjective side and to assume that it 
then, in a sense, rubs off on the world. 
 
Likewise, it is also not a belated, merely simile-like transfer, but a direct and 
originally apt characterization when one also ascribes a specific “Stimmung” 
to a landscape (particularly under certain atmospheric conditions) or a living 
space, or when one describes, in an emphatic manner, a visual representation 
of a landscape as an evening or moonlight “Stimmung.” One does not then, in 
a manner of speaking, ascribe a soul to the landscape; one is thinking, rather, 
of their shared permeation by the specific content of a “Stimmung,” which 
encompasses the human and the world together. “Stimmung” therefore does 
not belong to the isolated “inner life” of human beings; instead, human beings 
are included into the whole of the landscape, which in turn is not something 
that exists separately, but is rather related back to human beings in a particular 
way.30  
                                                 
30 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Das Wesen der Stimmungen (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), 39-40. 
It is strange that Bollnow’s classic has not been translated into English yet. For a translation of two 
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This might seem a tempting explanation, but can it really apply to adult human beings 
who experience “Stimmungen”? Can adults not, do they not, differentiate between 
themselves and the world when they feel, for example, sad in a cheerful crowd, an 
amusing theatre play, a homely street, or a bright landscape? It seems they can and do.  
To be sure, when sad they might find it difficult to be open to the incongruous positive 
atmosphere around them. As with strong emotions, moods also have this tendency to 
spill over, to rub off on their surroundings. Their lack of exact fit is a price we have to 
pay for their immediacy. Throughout our lives, we work on improving this fit through 
“sentimental education.” Despite this somewhat irrational tendency in our moods and 
emotions, we can and do distinguish between them and the state of our surroundings. 
 
It therefore seems that Otto Friedrich Bollnow has too primitive an idea of 
“Stimmungen.” What he says about the undivided unity between self and world may 
hold for babies and for some animals, but it does not seem apposite for adults.31 
Human beings may indeed begin their lives with what Sigmund Freud called the 
“oceanic feeling of being one with the universe” and what Max Scheler and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty referred to as “identification” or “pre-communication.”32 However, 
this primary unity must be distinguished from the differentiated unity that later 
develops upon its basis and that characterizes adult moods. While babies might just 
find themselves at home in or at one with the world, adults must open up to the 
atmosphere around them and make themselves at home. For adults, the issue of how 
moods permeate landscapes, buildings or artworks and how we respond to them 
remains a question. 
                                                 
central chapters of his book, see Philosophy of Emotions, eds. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev and Angelika Krebs 
(London: Routledge, 2017). 
31 It does not seem to hold for some animals either. As Robert C. Roberts warns in “The Sophistication 
of Non-Human Emotion,” in The Philosophy of Animal Minds, ed. Robert W. Lurz (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 218-236, we should not underestimate the complexity of animal 
emotion. Many animals are capable of other-regarding emotions like compassion, which presuppose the 
distinction between self and other. – To be fair to Bollnow, it must be noted that in later chapters of his 
book he tries to bring together the moods we undergo passively with the more refined attitudes 
(“Haltungen”) that we actively adopt. Still, he does not confront what this means for the initially 
postulated undivided unity between self and world in “Stimmung.” 
32 Cf. Peter Goldie, “Freud and the Oceanic Feeling,” in: Religious Emotions, eds.Willem Lemmens and 
Walter Van Herck (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008), 219-229; Max Scheler, Wesen 
und Formen der Sympathie (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), English: The Nature of Sympathy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1954); and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others,” in: The 
Merleau-Ponty Reader, eds. Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (Evanston: Northwetern University 
Press, 2007), 143-183. 
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The transition from primary unity to adult self-world differentiation is gradual. As the 
psychiatrist Ulrich Gebhard reports in his 1994 study Kind und Natur,33 small children 
perceive both the natural and the artificial world around them according to themselves 
and their current states. At ages 6 to 7, a child still believes everything to have 
consciousness. At around the age of 8, this is limited to moving things; at around 11 it 
applies only to moving things; and finally at age 12 only to animals. Gebhard quotes 
children’s phrases like “The sun shines because she is kind,” “The table is bad because 
he pushed me,” “The clouds want to make it rain,” “The rubber ball bounces off the 
wall and wants to be caught, while the wooden ball is too stupid for that.” 
 
Gebhard, in fact, believes that such child-like animism never fully leaves us. 
According to him, adults still “feed off” of these past experiences of unity; borders 
that are too rigid are damaging; when we reach old age, we often become like children 
again. As he sees it, our enlightened scientific worldview manages to conceal the 
magical with only a flimsy layer. 
 
As against Gebhard, I fear that we cannot have it both ways. We cannot both be 
scientifically literate and realize that landscapes are nonsentient and yet believe that 
they are somehow sentient nevertheless. I thus conclude that we have to confront the 
question of how “Stimmung” is infused into landscape. Let us now turn to four major 
answers to this question. 
  
1. Projective model 
This model harks back to our childhood, too. It differs from the preceding one in that 
first, it fully acknowledges the legitimacy of the question and, second, employs 
another psychological mechanism to account for moods in landscapes: projection 
instead of complete or partial unity.  
 
Peter Kurzeck gives a nice example of projection. When his little daughter Carina did 
not want to go to sleep although her parents had asked her to, she used to tell them that 
she herself would be happy to go to bed, but her teddy bear was not because it still 
                                                 
33 Cf. Ulrich Gebhard, Kind und Natur (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994). 
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needed to hear all about their day. Carina projected her own eagerness to stay up onto 
the teddy bear, so that she would not have to be responsible for it. 
 
Richard Wollheim has worked out the projective model in some detail.34 For him, the 
mechanism of projection lies at the heart of the phenomenon of expression both in art 
and landscape. While we find expression in landscapes, in art it is created by the 
artists.  
 
As Wollheim explains, projection is an internal act that we carry out under instinctual 
guidance, when we are either in a mental state that we value (like love or curiosity) 
and that we see as under threat, or in a state that we dread (like cruelty or melancholy) 
and by which we find ourselves threatened. Anxiety alerts us to this situation and 
projection alters it, bringing us some relief from this anxiety. At the beginning of life, 
projection occurs in a totally haphazard fashion. Only later does it become more 
orderly and the parts of the environment upon which features are projected are 
selected because of their affinity to these feelings. In consequence, these parts of the 
environment are experienced as of a piece with these feelings. 
  
Wollheim understands landscape atmospheres as complex projective properties. We 
identify them through experiences that we have; in this regard they are like secondary 
properties, such as colors, which would not exist if no one was there to see them. But 
projective properties differ from such secondary properties in being not only 
perceptual but also affective, with the affection directed not merely towards what is in 
front of one but also towards some older and more dominant object. The experience 
intimates or reveals a history, sometimes its own, usually only the kind of projective 
history of how it might have arisen. 
 
Simple projection projects an unwelcome psychological property onto another figure 
with psychology, thereby changing primarily the beliefs about this figure, whereas 
complex projection projects an unwelcome psychological property onto an 
environment without psychology, thereby changing primarily our attitude and not our 
beliefs. Furthermore, the property itself is changed; the peaceful character of the 
                                                 
34 Cf. Richard Wollheim, “Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts,” in 
Richard Wollheim, The Mind and its Depths (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 144-
158. 
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landscape is experienced not as a state of mind that inheres in the landscape 
irrespective of ourselves, but as continuous with our own peacefulness, as of a piece 
with it. 
 
This is an ingenious proposal. Yet again it seems to be too much driven by childhood 
needs, and negative ones for that matter, being too concerned with child-like anxiety 
and its relief, to do justice to the more rational and differentiated quality of adult 
moods and their experience of landscape atmospheres. 
 
2. Causal Model 
According to this much more straightforward model, a peaceful landscape only makes 
us feel peaceful. The landscape is not really peaceful itself. To call it peaceful is a 
loose manner of speaking, attributing back to it the feeling it has triggered in us.  
 
That landscapes have causal effects on us is beyond doubt. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, 
in his theory of colors for example, explored the psychological effects of colors, such 
as the soothing impact of the color green. Today, such causal effects are systematically 
used in light therapy against winter depression. 
 
3. Associative Model 
This is another uncomplicated and popular model. It explains the peacefulness of a 
landscape by its power to make us think of something peaceful, for example because it 
resembles something (like the face of a Saint Bernhard dog resembles a sad human 
face). But, again, the landscape is not really peaceful itself.35 
 
The problem with both models, the causal as well as the associative, is that they fail to 
capture that the peaceful feeling is intimately related to the landscape. How the 
landscape looks, sounds or smells is integral to a full description of the feeling. 
Contrast this with a bottle of wine that makes you cheerful and reminds you of the 
good old days. To describe your cheerfulness you do not need to talk about how the 
wine tastes. The peacefulness is in the landscape, whereas the cheerfulness is not in 
                                                 
35 On resemblance, see Peter Kivy’s contour theory in Peter Kivy, The Corded Shell (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), chapter eight. 
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the wine. Causal effects and associations are too external to account for the “within-
ness” or integrality of moods in landscapes. 
 
4. Metaphorical Model 
According to this last model, landscapes can indeed be peaceful in themselves, but not 
in the literal sense. In recent aesthetics, Nelson Goodman, Jerrold Levinson and Roger 
Scruton explicated this model for the arts.36 In music, for example, Roger Scruton 
distinguishes three levels: the primary and physical level of vibrations in the air; the 
secondary and phenomenal level of heard sounds, “audibilia” that the deaf person 
cannot hear; and the tertiary and musical level of tones heard in the sounds. To hear 
tones in music moving up and down, attracting and repelling each other, striving 
forward and lingering, crying out and comforting is to hear sounds through the 
metaphor of human life, of human movement in space, of human action and feeling. A 
metaphor is the deliberative application of a term or phrase to something that is known 
not to exemplify it, e.g. when Monday is called a blue day. By fusing dissimilar things, 
the thing’s aspect is changed, so that one responds to it in a different way. Hearing 
music, experiencing its moods, is metaphorical hearing. It is hearing with double 
intentionality, hearing both sounds and tones by hearing tones in sounds. 
 
Following on from this understanding, landscape atmospheres can be understood as 
tertiary aspects like moods in music. Landscape atmospheres are as real as their colors 
and sounds on the secondary level, which in turn are as real as the light waves and the 
air vibrations on the primary level. As Roger Scruton puts it: 
 
Because we are subjects the world looks back at us with a questioning regard, 
and we respond by organizing and conceptualizing it in other ways than those 
endorsed by science. The world as we live it is not the world as science 
                                                 
36 Cf. Nelson Goodman, “How Buildings Mean,” in Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and 
Sciences, eds. Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), 31-48; Jerrold 
Levinson, Music, Art, and Metaphysics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Roger Scruton, The 
Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). – For a good survey of the large variety of 
affective responses to music, see Jenefer Robinson, “Emotional Responses to Music: What Are They? 
How Do They Work? And Are They Relevant to Aesthetic Appreciation?” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 651-680. Robinson 
regards moods as non-intentional. Therefore she believes that music arouses moods primarily via 
contagion (“Jazzercise effect”), which corresponds to our causal model. 
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explains it, any more than the smile of the Mona Lisa is a smear of pigments 
on a canvas. But this lived world is as real as the Mona Lisa’s smile.37 
 
This lived world and our gazing devotion to its affective richness is to be defended 
against imperialist tendencies in the natural sciences and their mathematically 
calculating dominion over nature – “die rechnende Weltbemeisterung,” as Theodor 
Litt calls it.38 
 
Babies and some animals neither experience atmospheres in this sense nor do they see 
landscapes. They can only be said to feel atmospheres in the much simpler sense of 
primary (more or less porous) unity. Metaphorical experience, seeing x in terms of y, 
which it is not literally but which fits and reveals something about it, is a high 
achievement; it requires close attention and imagination. Poets are particularly skilled 
at this. They find “the magic word” and make “the world sing” – as Joseph Freiherr 
von Eichendorff famously puts it. Peter Kurzeck’s work abounds with such striking 
metaphors, personifying not only nature as that which no longer “speaks” to us but 
also mundane artifacts like his washing machine, which he hears as engrossed in a 
satisfied monologue (“die Waschmaschine in einem zufriedenen langen 
Selbstgespräch”).39  
 
The metaphorical model bears some similarity to the projective model. Metaphors are 
also “projective,” but in a much more general sense than the anxiety-driven 
psychoanalytic one employed in the projective model. 
 
 
V. Some basic types of experience 
 
In order to prepare the ground for the specifically aesthetic type of landscape 
experience, four more basic types should be distinguished: perception (or 
                                                 
37 Roger Scruton, The Face of God (London: Continuum, 2012), 128-129. 
38 Theodor Litt, Naturwissenschaft und Menschenbildung (Heidelberg: Quellen und Meyer, 1959), 166.  
39 Peter Kurzeck, Bis er kommt (Frankfurt: Stroemfeld, 2015), 323. On personification in Kurzeck, see 
Johannes Ullmaier, “Die Ewigkeiten macht man sich selbst: Zu Verlebendigung und Überzeitlichkeit 
bei Peter Kurzeck,” Text und Kritik 199, 2013: Peter Kurzeck, 58-70.  
For the larger picture, see Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory (London: Harper, 1995). This book 
explores the “myths” that “made landscape out of mere geography and vegetation” (12), including 
political myths such as the Nazi myth of Germania. 
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understanding), empathy (or vicarious/reproduced feeling), sympathy (or fellow 
feeling) and infection (or contagion). The contemporary debate on empathy, in which 
“empathy” can mean any of these different phenomena, still needs to regain the 
conceptual standard that phenomenology reached at the beginning of the last century, 
most notably in the writings of Max Scheler and Edith Stein.40 
 
1. Perception 
When we perceive that a landscape is peaceful, we remain affectively more or less 
neutral. We simply realize that it is peaceful (in the metaphorical sense). It does not 
require much attention or imagination to recognize the atmospheres of landscapes, as 
poetry and other creative arts have paved the way for us. We do not need to be 
aesthetically active ourselves to respond to landscapes, as Joachim Ritter and before 
him Georg Simmel seem to have thought (cf. III.3.). 
 
2. Empathy 
When we empathize with a peaceful landscape, we move with its atmosphere, 
enacting it but not sharing it. As the example of cruelty makes it clear, empathy 
occupies an intermediate position between perception and sympathy. Cruel people are 
not sympathetic to the suffering of their victims, but they still need empathy in order 
to fully enjoy their victims’ pain. 
 
3. Sympathy 
When we sympathize with a peaceful landscape, we move with its atmosphere and 
share it. We resonate emotionally, as we do when we listen to a favorite piece of 
                                                 
40 See Max Scheler, Wesen und Formen der Sympathie (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), English: The Nature of 
Sympathy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954); and Edith Stein, Zum Problem der Einfühlung 
(Freiburg: Herder, 2012), English: On the Problem of Empathy (Washington: ICS Publications, 1989). 
For an English summary and elaboration of Scheler’s position, cf. Peter Goldie, The Emotions (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), chapter seven; and Angelika Krebs, “The Phenomenology of Shared Feeling,” 
Appraisal 8, 2011, 35-50.  
In his 1934 treatise Art as Experience (London: Perigree, 2005), 54-55, John Dewey draws a similar 
distinction between recognition (identification, stereotyping, labeling, which corresponds to 1. 
perception), perception in the true, full sense (which for him is emotional and thus comes close to 3. 
sympathy), and being overwhelmed by something (which is passive and corresponds to 4. infection).  
In fact Scheler proposes two other categories of how we experience the emotions or moods of others: 
identification (or unification) and shared feeling (feeling-in-common/community of feeling). Both 
categories seem irrelevant for landscape experience. Scheler introduces identification as an extreme 
form of infection. An I sucks another in in all its vital attitudes or is sucked in by that other. Some of 
Scheler’s examples for this are child’s play (“I am mommy”), hypnosis or obsession. In shared feeling, 
two personal Is cooperate so as to feel one and the same emotion or mood. His example is two parents 
standing beside the dead body of a beloved child. 
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music. Sympathy is an emotion in the full sense, including bodily feeling, cognitive 
evaluation and behavior, while empathy is “only” a vivid mode of cognitive 
understanding; although in certain cases empathy can lead to actual emotions, it does 
not necessarily do so.41 Sympathy comes in two variants: participatory sympathy and 
meta-sympathy. Only the first is relevant for landscapes. In the second, we are sad 
about the sadness or bad situation of another, but we do not accompany her through 
her sadness as in the first variant.42  
 
4. Infection 
When we are infected by a peaceful landscape, we are swayed by its atmosphere. 
Infection is causal while perception, empathy and sympathy are intentional; they are 
directed towards the expressive quality of the landscape. In being directed towards an 
“other,” they presuppose some distance between self and other. Infection is not alert to 
this distance. Infection is relevant for mental health and wellness, but in itself it is not 
an aesthetic phenomenon.43 
 
 
VI. Aesthetic resonance 
 
This final section spells out how resonating aesthetically with landscape atmospheres 
can make us feel at home in the world. It distinguishes between stronger and weaker 
understandings. While beauty, especially functional beauty, allows for feeling 
perfectly at home, sublimity affords only a partial or ambivalent version. 
 
Aesthetic landscape experience involves not only attending to landscapes closely, 
perceiving their atmosphere (V.1.) and empathizing with it (V.2.), but also entering it 
                                                 
41 Cf. Peter Goldie, The Emotions (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 197; and Kendall Walton, “Spelunking, 
Simulation, and Slime,” in Emotions and the Arts, eds. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 37-49. 
42 For this distinction between two different kinds of sympathy cf. the first chapter of Edith Stein, Zum 
Problem der Einfühlung (Freiburg: Herder, 2012), English: On the Problem of Empathy (Washington: 
ICS Publications, 1989); and Gerda Walther, “Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften,” Jahrbuch 
für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung 6, 1923, 66-90. 
43 Many nature activities combine health and wellness with aesthetics. Think of hiking in the mountains 
or swimming in the sea. In such combined nature activities, nature is not replaceable by a gym. This 
irreplaceability adds force to the aesthetic argument for nature conservation. Still, the (replaceable) 
health and wellness effects of nature are of immense importance too. “Feeling at home” in nature is 
often due to these effects. Nevertheless, it is not this kind of feeling at home in nature that is explored 
here.   
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and sharing it (V.3.) for its own sake. In stressing the “intrinsic-ness” of aesthetic 
experience, as well as the distance that is constituent of perception, empathy and 
sympathy (as they are directed towards an “other”), this understanding is reminiscent 
of Kant’s aesthetics, even if his aesthetics is much colder than that. As John Dewey, 
among many others, observes, sympathetic emotions play no role in it: “To define the 
emotional element of esthetic perception merely as the pleasure taken in the act of 
contemplation, independent of what is excited by the matter contemplated, results, 
however, in a thoroughly anemic conception of art.”44 Instead of aesthetic 
contemplation, I therefore prefer to speak of aesthetic “resonance” (I will elaborate on 
the physical metaphor of resonance below). 
 
Still, in tandem with Kant, it is important to distinguish between aesthetic experience 
on the one hand and physiological and psychological (for example, hedonistic) impact 
or effect, on the other. This fundamental point is also stressed by Ludwig Wittgenstein 
in his 1938 Lectures on Aesthetics. Wittgenstein argues that aesthetic reactions – like 
the discomfort one might feel when a door is too low or a musical passage is 
incoherent, and the appreciation one might feel when a suit is the right length or a 
poetic image is precise – are “directed”; there is a “why” to aesthetic reactions, not a 
“cause” to them. Aesthetics is not “a branch of psychology.”45 
 
The main thesis of my paper about how aesthetically attractive landscapes can make 
us feel at home in the world does not concern causal impact or effect. Rather, it 
concerns the quality of the aesthetic experience itself, which can include, as a by-
product, the mood of feeling at home. 
 
Like most or all intrinsic activities, aesthetic sympathetic attention or resonance is 
accompanied by pleasure. Georg Henrik von Wright calls this kind of pleasure “active 
pleasure” and contrasts it with, first, “passive pleasure” such as the good taste of an 
apple, and, second, the “pleasure of satisfaction,” that is, the feeling we have when we 
                                                 
44 John Dewey, Art as Experience (London: Perigree, 2005), 264. On Dewey’s affective approach, see 
Christiane Voss, “Der affektive Motor des Ästhetischen,” in Kunst und Erfahrung, eds. Stefan Deines, 
Jaspar Liptow and Martin Seel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2013), 195-217. 
45 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief 
(Oxford: Blackwell 1966), 14 and 17. See also Roger Scruton, “A Bit of Help from Wittgenstein,” 
British Journal of Aesthetics 51, 2011, 309-319. 
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get what we want.46 It is an intricate philosophical problem as to whether active 
pleasure (as an overall feeling, which might also involve some struggle and suffering, 
such as in the process of artistic creation), is a conceptually necessary and defining 
element of all that is done for its own sake or whether it is only typical of it. What is 
clear, however, is that we cannot intentionally induce active pleasure. It arises only 
when we are absorbed in the activity and forget about our daily worries. It is a by-
product of the activity. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi has popularized the notion of the 
self-forgetful drive, which characterizes active pleasure as flow, a term that Dewey 
also employs when he writes about the organic, rounded character of what he calls “an 
experience,” which roughly corresponds to what I call intrinsic experience: “every part 
flows freely, without seam and without unfilled blanks, into what ensues.”47  
 
Csikszentmihalyi presents empirical findings to show how, in some particularly 
successful cases of actively pleasant intrinsic activities, the subjects become aware of 
themselves as part of a larger whole. As he sees it, there is nothing esoteric or 
metaphysical in this: “When a person invests all her psychic energy into an interaction 
– whether it is with another person, a boat, a mountain, or a piece of music – she in 
effect becomes part of a system of action greater than what the individual self had 
been before.”48 Martin Buber in I and Thou describes the same phenomenon in 
different terms, when he writes about the mystic: 
 
What the ecstatic man calls union is the enrapturing dynamic of relation, not a 
unity arisen in this moment of the world’s time that dissolves the I and Thou, 
but the dynamic of relation itself, which can put itself before its bearers as they 
steadily confront one another, and cover each from the feeling of the other 
enraptured one. Here, then, on the brink, the relational act goes beyond itself; 
the relation itself in its vital unity is felt so forcibly that its parts seem to fade 
before it, and in the force of its life, the I and the Thou, between which it is 
established, are forgotten.49 
 
                                                 
46 Cf. Georg Henrik von Wright, The Varieties of Goodness (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1993), 63-65. 
47 John Dewey, Art as Experience (London: Perigree, 2005), 37-38. 
48 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 65. 
49 Martin Buber, Ich und Du (Darmstadt: Lambert Schneider, 1997), English: I and Thou, (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 69. 
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Another example of this phenomenon familiar to musicians is the feeling you can get 
when, after rehearsing a symphony with the orchestra, it suddenly seems as if the 
music or the orchestra plays you. Before, it was you who played your instrument 
together with all the others who played theirs. Now, you feel a part of the whole. And 
this is a new experience over and above the active pleasure you have felt all along in 
rehearsing the symphony with the other musicians. 
 
Because of its holistic direction, this feeling of differentiated unity or being at home 
can be regarded as a mood. In contrast, mere active pleasure or flow seems to be 
“only” a non-intentional bodily feeling.  
 
To sum up, the affective quality of aesthetic experience highlighted so far lies in 
sympathy and in flow on the one hand plus, in some cases, the feeling of being at 
home on the other. The physical metaphor of resonance underlines this affective 
quality.  
 
However, the metaphor of resonance might be misleading in at least three ways. First, 
physical resonance occurs when one object vibrates with another at the same or a 
similar natural frequency, e.g. when the G- and D-strings of a violin vibrate with a G-
major chord on a piano. This is a causal phenomenon, whereas aesthetic resonance is 
first and foremost intentional sympathy.50  
 
Second, physical resonance is not only causal but also instantaneous; aesthetic 
resonance, in contrast, requires a “gymnastics of attention” (to borrow a phrase from 
Roger Scruton). It takes time and effort; only sometimes, in learnt spontaneity, does it 
occur instantaneously. We can distinguish the immediate seizure by an aesthetic 
atmosphere from the discrimination that sets in afterwards, which may or may not 
validate the first immediate impression. This first impression is directed and is not to 
be confused with infection. 
                                                 
50 The metaphor of resonance therefore also fits non-aesthetic human phenomena such as being infected 
by laughter or crying, which could be called “causal resonances.” Other non-causal types of resonance 
are “biographical resonance” (when you feel at home in your neighborhood, cf. I.3.3.) and “social 
resonance” (when you are in harmony with certain people, sharing activities, emotions and moods with 
them). In his book Resonanz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2016) Hartmut Rosa investigates all these types. 
See also his earlier book Beschleunigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005), English: Social Acceleration 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), which views social acceleration as a “resonance killer.” 
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Third, physical resonance tends to be bilateral (and even amplifying: think of the 
famous example of marching soldiers collapsing a bridge). Not only does the violin 
resonate with the piano, the piano resonates back with the violin. This has led Hartmut 
Rosa to conceptualize resonance in general, including aesthetic resonance, as a mutual 
phenomenon. For him, resonance is not an echo relation, but a response relation; it 
requires that both parties speak with their own voices.51 In aesthetic resonance, as he 
has it, not only do we respond to the world, the world also responds to us. Rosa 
criticizes bourgeois one-sided understandings of aesthetic resonance with nature, but 
praises children and indigenous people for their more immediate and mutual aesthetic 
dialogue with nature; he also talks of nature taking revenge on us for what we have 
done to her. This mutual concept of aesthetic resonance, however, slips into 
metaphysics, as nature does not respond to us in any literal sense. To distinguish 
Rosa’s concept from mine, his would better be called “rosanence.” What Rosa might 
have in mind is the Eichendorffian phenomenon of the magic word, which sounds the 
song that sleeps in all things. Soberly understood, this phenomenon is nothing but our 
feeling that our metaphors fit the world. We create our metaphors but we cannot create 
the fit. The fit must happen by itself. If it does, it feels as if the world responds to us 
and begins to sing.52  
 
1. Beauty 
Landscapes are beautiful in the broad sense when they invite and reward intrinsic 
sympathetic attention or resonance. Their appeal, similar to the appeal of everything 
that is beautiful, is not limited to some of us, but open to all. Aesthetic landscape 
resonance is not just a subjective preference, as travel guides and art criticism prove. It 
is a universally accessible form that the desire for beauty can take. The desire for 
beauty is an anthropological constant. Fulfilling this desire in one way or another is an 
important part of the good human life. As morality requires respect for the essentials 
of the good life of all human beings, conserving beauty is a moral obligation.  
 
                                                 
51 Hartmut Rosa, Resonanz (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2016), 298. 
52 This is also how the phenomenon is accounted for by Theodor Litt, Naturwissenschaft und 
Menschenbildung (Heidelberg: Quellen und Meyer, 1959); Josef König, “Die Natur der ästhetischen 
Wirkung,” in Josef König, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Freiburg: Alber 1978, 256-337; and Georg Misch, 
Der Aufbau der Logik (Freiburg: Alber, 1994). 
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How beautiful landscapes and other beautiful objects or ensembles manage to lure and 
satisfy us is, of course, the central question of aesthetics. Classical answers stress 
symmetry, harmony or unity in diversity. Modern answers focus on the experiencing 
subject. According to the Kantian answer, beautiful objects or ensembles bring our 
faculties of understanding and imagination into free play. This intellectual Kantian 
model should at least be complemented by the idea of a “free play of sympathy.”53 It is 
not only our cognitive faculties that are attracted and challenged by beauty but also 
our affective powers. Beauty does not only make us think about many things, it also 
makes us feel many things. It makes us open up and grow both rationally and 
emotionally.   
 
Do the atmospheric and the beautiful then amount to the same thing (at least for 
beautiful landscapes and expressive art)? Not necessarily. Something might have a 
strong positive or negative atmosphere in the sense of an overwhelming impact, 
infecting us but not inviting us to attend to and sympathize with it for its own sake. 
Kitsch could be an example of this. We might formulate this point differently: what is 
merely atmospheric has an atmosphere, while what is beautiful expresses an 
atmosphere. If we put the point like this we would, however, be employing a weak 
notion of expression that would allow us to say that beautiful landscapes express 
atmospheres. We could not limit the notion of expression to artworks that admittedly 
are expressive in a different and deeper sense than landscapes. Expressive art is a kind 
of communication. It has a message. It pursues meaning. It articulates, explores and 
meditates on human concepts in a structure all of its own. Expressiveness in art is an 
achievement. This does not hold for landscapes. Compared with art, the 
expressiveness of landscapes is a superficial phenomenon.54  
 
Can landscapes be kitsch? Representations of landscapes can evidently be kitsch. 
Think of postcards with orange sunsets over the Adriatic Sea or oil paintings of 
bellowing stags. But what about landscapes themselves? We sometimes call them 
kitsch. Yet what we might mean by this is that they are almost too beautiful, too easy 
to enjoy (exactly appropriate for “Kitsch-Menschen” who are out for easy 
                                                 
53 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 355. 
54 John Dewey, Art as Experience (London: Perigree, 2005), 67, compares artistic expression with the 
extraction of juice from grapes in a winepress. Roger Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 158, and The Face of God (London: Continuum, 2012), chapter five, denies 
that landscapes can express anything. 
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gratification) or that they have been overused and spoilt for us by commercials and 
Hollywood movies. Nevertheless, we must admit that if we try hard enough and break 
through the clichés, we can always find something in the landscapes themselves. 
Nature is so varied and rich. Therefore, natural landscapes cannot be kitsch.  Highly 
cultivated landscapes, in contrast, can be. Take landscape parks with little bridges, 
fake temples and castles, garden gnomes and too many overly rosy blossoming 
flowers. For such kitsch, however, human beings are to blame and not nature. 
 
Landscape beauty is special and cannot be replaced by other kinds of beauty. If it were 
replaceable, nothing much would follow from the aesthetic argument in terms of 
landscape conservation. One reason why landscape beauty is special is that we 
experience landscapes synaesthetically and feel them with all our senses, not only 
with our eyes and ears, which are more capable of aesthetic distance than our noses, 
tongues and fingers are. We even move around in landscapes. Sensual feeling and, yes, 
infection is part and parcel of aesthetic landscape experience.55 We can thus add 
infection to the affective aspects of aesthetic landscape experience outlined so far, 
which include sympathy, flow and feeling at home. Infection serves to increase the 
immersive effect of beautiful landscapes, so that we may feel at home in them, both 
sensually and aesthetically. 
 
Architecture comes close to landscapes in this respect without sharing all its attributes 
(no wind, no rain, no sunshine etc.).56 Nevertheless, architecture and landscapes do 
share many other specific features. Let me mention eight more. First, both contain us; 
they are not positioned opposite us and framed like pictures on a wall (which, again, 
increases the immersive effect). Second, the beauty of both is of the expressive rather 
than the representational kind. Third, the sublime is more common in our natural and 
architectural environment than it is in art. Fourth, architecture and landscapes are more 
easily accessible than most art; you do not have to know that much in order to enjoy 
                                                 
55 See Hans Jonas, “Der Adel des Sehens,” in Hans Jonas, Organismus und Freiheit (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck, 1973), 198-225, English: “The Nobility of Sight,” in Hans Jonas, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 14, 1954, 507-519. See also Arnold Berleant, The Aesthetics of 
Environment (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); and Gernot Böhme, Atmosphäre 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995). 
56 But could not all that is special about nature be faked or imitated in architecture (or even in 
cyberspace)? The answer is no. As imitations go, if people know they are only imitations, they want the 
original, the authentic and real thing. And how could they not know if nature was faked (given 
transparent political systems and public knowledge of human and natural history)? 
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them aesthetically. Fifth, both are public, or at least not hidden away in the private 
sphere; you often cannot avoid them. Sixth, both are localized; they cannot be moved 
around like pictures or books, and this makes them especially vulnerable to what is 
around them. Seventh, the beauty of both is largely functional; it presupposes that they 
fulfill their function but it does not reside in this; rather it resides in the way the 
residue, which is not determined by function, is formed (this is more true of 
architecture than of landscapes: while buildings are defined by their functions, 
landscapes are individuated by their atmospheres). And eighth, both can make us feel 
at home in the world.57 
 
Yet, in architecture, it is the human world, the history of human ends and ideals, not 
the natural world, in which we might feel at home. And this makes all the difference. 
Beautiful landscapes are irreplaceable first and foremost because they fulfill our 
conscious or unconscious longing to be part of and not alienated from the natural 
world, the world that is just there, that comes into being and vanishes by virtue of 
itself. Beautiful landscapes heal the rift between subject and nature, both the nature 
out there and the nature in us. Living in harmony with nature in this sense is more than 
an enriching option for a good life; it is an essential part of human flourishing. Here is 
Otto Friedrich Bollnow once more:  
 
It is disastrous when humans live in the stony deserts of cities, in rooms that 
more often than not are fully air-conditioned, and are scarcely affected 
anymore by the changing seasons. For this reason, it is extremely important 
that humans experience the rhythms of nature as well as the rhythms that order 
their own lives, that they feel the pauses and slow down for them, and then 
respond to the reawakening of life in the spring with all their energy, 
experiencing it as a radical renewal. But this can only occur in the intense 
                                                 
57 On how architecture makes us feel at home, see Steen Eiler Rasmussen, Experiencing Architecture 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1959); Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Mensch und Raum (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1963), English: Human Space (London: Hyphen Press, 2011); Alexander Mitscherlich, 
Die Unwirtlichkeit der Städte (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1965); Roger Scruton, The Classical Vernacular 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994); Karsten Harries, The Ethical Function of Architecture 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Juhani Pallasma, The Eyes of the Skin (New York: John Wiley, 
2005); and Peter Zumthor, Atmosphären (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006). 
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experience of the sprouting green of nature. As Hölderlin writes in his lovely 
verses, the “holy green” “refreshes” us and transforms us into youths again.58 
 
Beautiful landscapes teach us how to “dwell on earth,” Bollnow continues, following 
Martin Heidegger.59 They give us a sense of place and make us honor it. They invite 
us to put down roots somewhere and identify and care for it as our special “Heimat,” 
and this links the aesthetic argument with the identity argument (in I.3.2.). We need 
neither a dubious teleological metaphysics nor a dubious holistic ontology, neither 
deep ecology nor posthumanism to understand that we are part of the natural world 
and should act accordingly. Deep humanism and the experience of natural beauty 
suffice. 
 
2. Sublimity 
There are stronger and weaker forms of feeling at home in nature. So far I have mainly 
talked about the strongest one, perfect sympathetic coordination, which feels like 
unity. 
 
Often, however, we succeed only partially in our attempt at sympathetically moving 
with something. Our failure need not be due to ourselves; it could also be due to the 
landscape. The classical distinction between the beautiful and the sublime is relevant 
here. For our purposes, it can be reconstructed as follows. Only the beautiful (now in a 
more limited sense than before and no longer synonymous with “aesthetically 
attractive”) allows us to be fully taken up in it. The sublime, in its infinite extent and 
power, entices us to sympathetically move with it, too. The subject enjoys 
participating in its magnitude and strength. However, the subject also feels painfully 
reminded of her own insignificance and vulnerability. The sublime confronts us with a 
tension between a celebration of the landscape and self-negation. Still, insofar as the 
sublime appeals to us and invites us to partially move with it, neither leaving us cold 
                                                 
58 Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “Die Stadt, das Grün und der Mensch,“ in Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Zwischen 
Philosophie und Pädagogik (Aachen: O.F. Weitz, 1988), 44-62, 55. 
59 Cf. Martin Heidegger, “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken,” in Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951), 145-164, English: “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in Martin Heidegger, 
Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper, 2013), 141-160. 
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nor threatening us existentially, it is possible to talk about feeling at home, in a weaker 
sense, in sublime nature too.60 
 
3. Functional beauty 
A third understanding of feeling at home in nature opens up when we attend to the 
landscape that surrounds us not as such, but in relation to ourselves, that is, in its 
functionality for our own good. In Kantian terminology, the latter kind of experience 
is directed at the “dependent” beauty of the landscape and not at its “pure” beauty. A 
landscape that looks as if it affords a good human life is beautiful in the functional 
sense. It is ugly if it doesn’t. Thus, contrary to “positive aesthetics,” there is a sense in 
which nature can be ugly.61 
 
The distinction between functional and pure beauty must not be confused with the 
point made right at the beginning of section II., namely, that most landscapes today 
are marked by human labor. Even pristine nature can be functionally beautiful. 
Admittedly, it will be less frequently so than cultivated nature. It is no accident that 
we speak about the “Garden” of Eden. In functionally beautiful landscapes we feel at 
home, not only because they have a good physiological and psychological impact on 
us, but also because they indicate, by the way they look, sound and smell, that they 
can support human life and provide for its needs. Evolutionary aesthetics, which traces 
our sense for beauty back to our sense for landscapes with a high survival value for 
our species, like the savannah, finds a limited justification here.62 
                                                 
60 Cf. Tom Cochrane, “The Emotional Experience of the Sublime,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42, 
2012, 125-148; and Emily Brady, The Sublime in Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). Otto Friedrich Bollnow makes a similar point in “Mensch und Natur,” http://www.otto-
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Alpen (München: Beck, 1991).  
61 For positive aesthetics see Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment (London: Routledge, 
2000); and Malcolm Budd, The Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
62 See Denis Dutton, The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution (Oxford: Oxford 
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In his Ästhetik der Natur (“Aesthetics of Nature”), Martin Seel calls this functional 
aesthetic dimension “corresponsive” and contrasts it with two other aesthetic 
dimensions, the “contemplative” and the “imaginative.”63 His contemplative 
dimension concerns the pure beauty of nature, whereas his imaginative dimension 
looks at nature through the prism of art, especially landscape painting. As Seel’s neo-
Kantian aesthetics is perhaps the most refined and thorough contemporary work on 
environmental aesthetics, I will, by way of ending, explore how my approach relates 
to his. 
 
Seel explains his three dimensions by referring to the view across Lake Constance 
from his former office at the University of Constance. The first, contemplative 
experience of nature sees nature “as a cheering space of detachment from active life.” 
It perceives nature by abstracting it from the significance and value of things for social 
recognition and action. The I dissolves and disappears in the space of nature. This 
view of Lake Constance is free of meaning; it responds to a constantly changing 
sensual play of appearances – the dancing of light reflexes, the corrugation of the 
waves, the fanning of the colors – but it does not endow them with any particular 
significance other than what they are. 
 
                                                 
63 Martin Seel, Eine Ästhetik der Natur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991). For an English translation of some 
core ideas, see Martin Seel, “Aesthetic Arguments in the Ethics of Nature,” Thesis Eleven 32, 1992, 76-
89, esp. 77-80; for a critical review see Catherine Rigby, “Beyond the Frame: Art, Ecology and the 
Aesthetics of Nature,” Thesis Eleven 32, 1992, 114-128. 
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The second, corresponsive perception of nature experiences nature “as a place that 
illustrates a successful human life.” It opens up an articulated space that is no longer 
meaning-free, but rather highly meaningful, in which the synaesthetic I is enclosed. 
This existentially interested gaze at Lake Constance sees the refreshing coolness of the 
lake’s surface in summer and the warming vapor of the mist in winter. It remains 
attached to certain places in memory or in anticipating feelings of joy. 
 
Third, the imaginative experience of nature renders nature “as a mirror of the human 
world full of images.” Nature is seen as if it were an artwork freely improvising on 
other works and styles of art. The I finds that her horizon is widened as a result of this 
double reflection of her being-in-the-world. That kind of gaze at Lake Constance 
perceives the way in which the lake communicates with Claude Lorrain and Antoine 
Watteau, and later with William Turner and Ferdinand Hodler.64 
 
The experience of landscape that I have dealt with here is not tantamount to Seel’s 
“corresponsive” mode, as one might assume at first sight. Rather it is meant to cover 
all three modes, including the contemplative one. In contrast to Seel, I believe that all 
three kinds of nature experience can make us feel at home or “enclosed” in the world. 
Seel tends to exaggerate the differences between them anyway. Seel goes too far when 
he denies that a landscape, which we experience contemplatively, can have any 
expressive articulateness, any anthropomorphic expression. Seel’s formalism or 
autonomism of contemplation is reminiscent of similar movements in the aesthetics of 
music and architecture that claim to be exclusively concerned with a meaning-free 
play of appearances while the language they employ to render this disinterestedness is 
permeated with expressiveness. Are the “dancing” of light reflexes or the corrugation 
of waves on Lake Constance not anthropomorphic and expressive, after all? 
 
Yet what is particularly convincing is Seel’s anti-metaphysical stance. He sternly 
resists every temptation to read the beauty of nature as a “wink” (in Kant’s words) 
given to us by the world or by God, signaling that we are welcome in the world. Roger 
Scruton seems less transparent and steadfast regarding this point. Who is reassuring 
us, we want to ask, when Scruton writes about the experience of natural beauty: “It 
contains a reassurance that this world is a right and fitting place to be – a home in 
                                                 
64 All the quoted phrases are translations from page 18 in Seel’s book. 
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which our human powers and prospects find confirmation”?65 The main objective of 
my paper has been to develop the aesthetic case for nature conservation as an 
alternative to metaphysical or theological approaches. An aesthetics of nature that 
does not steer clear of metaphysics itself cannot fit this bill. 
                                                 
65 Roger Scruton, Beauty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65; cf. also “I have come to see 
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